About the Journal

Journal History

The Griffith Journal of Law & Human Dignity was set up in 2012 by Dr Allan Ardill in collaboration with the following gifted law students: Ryan Anderson, Adele Anthony, Jessica Armao, Mark Brady, Brianna Edwards, Jason Garrick, Simone Gray, Mignote Hannaford, Beau Hanson, Jonathan Kwok, Kelli Lemass, Troy Maloney, Daniel Marcantelli, Adam Saunders, and Danielle Warren.  

Focus and Scope

The Griffith Journal of Law & Human Dignity strives to advance personal freedom and human dignity through fearless and novel scholarship. The Journal is committed to big picture analysis, transformative approaches to law, and giving voice to those who have been silenced, disenfranchised, or marginalised. 

The objectives of the Journal are to:

  • Advance personal freedom and human dignity;
  • Examine issues lying at the intersection of law and social justice and civil liberties;
  • Give voice to those who may be silenced, disenfranchised, or marginalised;
  • Create a space for new and novel legal narratives;
  • Highlight law’s potential as an instrument of positive social change through reform of existing laws; and
  • Provide a space for critical legal scholarship addressing the big picture issues facing law and the people of the world.

Acknowledgement of Country

The Griffith Journal of Law & Human Dignity acknowledges the traditional custodians of the Australian lands upon which we publish the lands of the Bundjalung, Yugambeh, Kombumerri Yugarabul, Yuggera, Jagera, and Turrbal peoples. We pay our respect to the ancestors and the Elders, past and present. The Journal also recognises First Nations and Indigenous populations around the globe.

Publication Frequency

The Griffith Journal of Law & Human Dignity is published twice a year. The submission dates are 31 January (Issue 1) and 31 July (Issue 2).

Peer Review Process

The Griffith Journal of Law & Human Dignity is a double-blind refereed scholarly law journal.

Open Access Policy

The Griffith Journal of Law & Human Dignity provides immediate open access to its content on the principle that making research freely available to the public supports a greater global exchange of knowledge. 

Narrative Policy

What is a narrative?

Narratives are articles written in the first person as personal accounts. “Narrativism” or storytelling is the idea that ‘we live our lives in a host of stories, which have connection with the stories of other people in various ways,’[1] and so ‘our identities are created by a vast web of stories, as is our relationship with reality.’[2]

Why do we publish narratives?

Storytelling is a crucial social practice central to humanity. It is also becoming more acceptable in scholarly literature in the wake of postmodernist thought and scepticism about political objectivity and enlightenment positivism. As historian of the philosophy of science, Paul Feyerabend, said:

I assert that there exist no “objective” reasons for preferring science and western rationalism to other traditions. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine what such reasons might be.[3]… my main objection against intellectual solutions of social problems is that they start from a narrow cultural background, ascribe universal validity to it and use power to impose it on others…[4]

At the Griffith Journal of Law & Human Dignity we respect science while rejecting the proposition that science and narrativism are mutually exclusive. Narrative knowledge is therefore encouraged and welcomed by the Journal of Law & Human Dignity. We embrace narrative knowledge as a legitimate way of knowing and not merely as a supplement to traditional scientific methods.[5] We accept the proposition that:

Traditional forms of knowledge (knowing how and knowing that) are not sufficient to cover a third kind of knowledge (knowing what it is like) in the way that storytelling can.[6]

This is because:

To know requires knowledge from the inside whereas, to know about is based on knowledge from outside the subject. These two ways of knowing inform us that there are limits to knowing an “Other”. These limitations will exist in any inter subjective relationship, and the degree to which they influence the power relations depends on the structural location of the subject position one occupies.[7]

Therefore, the Journal welcomes articles written in the first person.

Authenticity and refereeing

All articles published by the Griffith Journal of Law & Human Dignity are double-blind peer reviewed. On occasions it may be possible to identify the author of a narrative and in these situations the article will be refereed by at least two anonymous referees. Articles must fit the Journal mission and objectives and will also be assessed according to authenticity and integrity.

Author advice

Articles are not necessarily more objective or persuasive just because they are written in the first person. What matters is the content of the article, how it is expressed, by whom, and for what reasons. Our readers expect authors to link their ideas to our mission and objectives and to aim for clarity, conciseness and simplicity. In many situations it will be clearer and more truthful to say “I found” rather than “It was found that”. However, it is crucial when writing in the first person that “we” is not used to universalise what is really an anecdotal, personal, and/or privileged assertion. For example; “we need to amend the Racial Discrimination Act to remove references to ‘insult’ and ‘offend’ and leave in place ‘vilification’”. Authors should not assume that readers of the Griffith Journal of Law & Human Dignity share their experience of the world.

Please avoid technical terms and jargon and only use them where it is necessary. Be clear and concise, remove redundant words, and avoid embellishment. Use an active voice because it will help to reduce sentence length and it will improve clarity. For example it is better to say “Australian people consume more resources” (active voice) than “more resources are consumed by people in Australia” (passive voice).


[1] Sefan Snaevaar, “Don Quixote and the Narrative Self” (2007) March/April Issue 60 Philosophy Now 6, 6.

[2] Ibid.

[3] Paul Feyerabend, Farewell to Reason (Verso, 1990) 297.

[4] Ibid 305.

[5] Ibid 307.

[6] Sarah Worth, ’Narrative Knowledge: Knowing Through Storytelling,’ MIT4: Media in Transition: The Work of Stories Conference, May 2005, <web.mit.edu/comm-forum/mit4/papers/worth.pdf>; See also ‘Story - Telling and Narrative Knowing,’ (2008) 42(3) Journal of Aesthetic Education 42, 42 - 55.

[7] Aileen Moreton-Robinson, Talkin’ Up to the White Woman: Indigenous Women and Feminism in Australia, PhD Dissertation, School of Humanities, Griffith University, Nathan, 1998, 216. An argument made equally well in Maria C. Lugones and Elizabeth V. Spelman, ’Have we got a theory for you‘ in Naomi Zack, Laurie Shrage and Crispin Sartwell (eds), Race, Class, Gender and Sexuality: The Big Questions (Wiley-Blackwell, 1998) 381 – 382.