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LAW & HUMAN DIGNITY

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REGIME CHANGE GEOPOLITICS: OBSTACLES TO FREEDOM AND DIGNITY

JOHN BRAITHWAITE*

This essay seeks to honour the anniversary of The Griffith Journal of Law & Human Dignity and its narrative commitment to freedom and dignity. The Journal is a light on law's hill. I draw attention to a concern where that light should shine more brightly. The argument is that social movement weakness and social democratic sloth in rich countries has allowed regime change machinations (sometimes motivated by a desire to protect democracy) to devastate Indigenous peoples, women through high rates of femicide, and crush democracy. That inattention has fostered cascades of war and crime, and criminalization of markets and of states. The narrative sees the present as a time of some hope for struggles to reverse these tyrannies.

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* University of Maryland and Emeritus, Australian National University. This essay is based on a Nigel Walker Lecture at Cambridge University, May 2022. My thanks for helpful audience feedback there and from reviewers.

I JOURNEY FROM GRIFFITH

My first teaching job was in the School of Humanities at Griffith from 1975; I was first to teach a criminology course. I worked on the relationship between freedom and crime and learnt much from interdisciplinary teachers of the first intake of students to the university. It was hardly a strong law/criminology university then, but definitely became that after I departed! This research continued until publication of *Macrocriminology and Freedom*.¹ That book is about the idea that a great variety of legal and normative checks and balances are needed if citizens are to enjoy freedom and dignity. For Philip Pettit and I, a thin liberal version of freedom that expands choices and limits interference in individual choices is less fundamental to human dignity than freedom as non-domination, freedom from being under the arbitrary power of others.² This contribution is no rehash of those arguments. It seeks to add value by explaining one specific obstacle to freedom and dignity neglected in my earlier work.

This obstacle is geopolitical competition that motivates interference and regime change of foreign states. The starting point for the analysis is a view that patriarchal interests cannot hold down uprisings of suffragists and feminists forever; tyrannical monarchists could not pin down uprisings of chartists, republicans, and people power movements for democracy forever; business power cannot contain assertion of environmental rights forever; homophobic hegemony could not suppress gender diverse rights forever; slave trading capital could not suppress the anti-slavery movement. It is a natural part of the human condition to want to resist domination. Crushing that resistance is common, but so are victories against tyranny.

II COSETTE'S JOURNEY FROM PARIS TO BARCALDINE

One psychological theory that continues to be plausible to many children, parents and grandparents is Alfred Adler's.³ He argues that that to be a child is to be a human who struggles for release from domination by, and dependence on, parents. Struggle against

¹ John Braithwaite, *Macrocriminology and Freedom* (ANU Press, 2022).

² John Braithwaite and Philip Pettit, *Not Just Deserts: A Republican Theory of Criminal Justice* (Oxford University Press, 1990); Philip Pettit, *Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Government* (Oxford University Press, 1997).

³ Alfred Adler, *Individual Psychology of Alfred Adler* (Harper Perennial, 1964).

domination motivates much of what humans do and value. This struggle as infants helps us become capable of surviving independently; it infuses our value framing of our world. The struggle in turn can motivate humans who are economically comfortable white churchgoers to become self-sacrificing activists who build a global movement against slavery. An economically comfortable Victor Hugo, can write a novel that ordinary Parisians flock to read, revive as theatre, and re-revive as cinema. They devour Hugo because he reveals how the oppression of industrialization, the tyranny and indignity of its justice system, and how the capitalism of human trafficking weighs on the lives of Fantine and her daughter Cosette. Not only is Fantine trafficked; so is her hair, her front teeth, her daughter. Hugo drags our spirits down from the false dawn of the 1831 uprising in Paris, where French citizens are too dominated by these institutions, especially by the secret police embodied by Inspector Javert. The people are too dominated to surge onto the streets in support of Cosette's friends. They are cut down in 1831. Yet the finale of the 49th film version of *Les Misérables* (2012) is uplifting cinematography of a return to the barricades for the Paris Commune of 1848 when the people of Paris do surge to support revolutionary republicans, socialists and feminists.

If you have engaged with Hugo's text, you have imbibed the core message of *Macrocriminology and Freedom* through an infinitely more engaging writer. It can be enjoyed through the 2012 film that encapsulates the political message even better than *Les Mis* the musical. There was no profound renewal of republican political institutions immediately after 1848 in France, nor across Europe – certainly no socialist or feminist revolution. But uprisings did quickly, and widely cascade from the Paris Commune right across Europe and more slowly infected republican, socialist and feminist social movement politics on the racist and patriarchal Australian frontier at Eureka – the uprising and enduring movement in support of Ned Kelly. Australian writing memorializing the oppression of Ned's mum by the police, the oppression by the troopers of a swagman who sings *Waltzing Matilda*, and under a Tree of Knowledge in Barcaldine,⁴ sees a distinctively rural labour movement inspired by shearer unionization. The shearers usher onstage the world's first 'labourist' government in Queensland.⁵ The Jean

⁴ Robert Mason and Rebecca Damjanovic, 'The Start of It All? Heritage, Labour and Environment in Regional Queensland' (2018) 25(2) *Queensland Review* 208-221.

⁵ Teaching Griffith students, I loved to use Dennis Murphy's biography of the young Queensland Premier, TJ Ryan, to grasp the labour movement journey from Barcaldine to Brisbane, to Canberra. Ryan surely would have become prime minister had he not so young passed streets of Brisbane lined by massive crowds

Valjeans of the 1891 Shearer's Strike are sentenced to hard labour on Saint Helena Island, but build the labour movement along the democratic path taken from the Tree of Knowledge. Revolutionary war was the path not taken from Barcaldine, though there were many advocates of that at Barcaldine, Eureka and in Northern Victoria after Ned was captured.

Tom Griffith's inspiring recent contribution to the *Griffith Review* shows that amidst the structurally racist conditions of the frontier wars not far from Barcaldine, there was even a treaty that sought to lift the oppression of violence from the backs of Aboriginal and settler Australians.⁶ Like Hugo, Griffiths does something important in revealing a suppressed narrative of our continent's history of domination, and struggle against domination. Ours has been a society devoid of narratives of treaty to cascade dignity for all First Nations Australians. Now finally, we have the beauty and the promise of the Uluru Statement from the Heart. The narrative conditions for that cascade of peace, and against domination, finally, hopefully, are arriving by the hands of the original Australians.

We can experience moments when we might take our heart to the Tree of Knowledge. I once explained to an American Indigenous leader how spiritually impoverished, I was, and consequently so ineffective in peace processes compared to spiritually deep Indigenous elders who have what Maori call *Mana*. He did not say, as I feared, 'you have no hope of that white man.' He said, 'that is easy, take your heart to trees that connect to your heart.' So, one day in Belfast soon after the Belfast Good Friday Agreement, hearts were taken to the Tree of Knowledge. A restorative peace encounter about a new justice system for Northern Ireland and a new Royal Ulster Constabulary was going badly. There had been an incident when a senior RUC man walked across the room to shake the hand of an IRA man he had tortured. As he approached, his close personal protection guy scuttled to his side. The IRA combatant took offence at this. I jettisoned my prepared talk at the set-piece part of proceedings. Instead, I spoke of the path not taken by Irish shearers from the Tree of Knowledge. Before that, I spoke of how the troopers oppressed Ned's mum; some in the audience knew more about Ned than me. During their time in prison, the IRA and Loyalist hard men had grown stronger bonds with each other as

of mourners to arrive at Toowong Cemetery: Dennis Murphy, *TJ Ryan: A Political Biography* (University of Queensland Press, 1990).

⁶ Tom Griffiths, 'But We Already Had a Treaty! Returning to the Debney Peace' (2022) 76 *Griffith Review* 154-169.

working-class victims of the violence. Both actually had bitter grievances with the RUC. For these men, some of whom, like Ned, had killed more than one police officer, the Kelly narrative resonated – so it did with the RUC participants. I told them the story of sitting by a policeman friend during a play on Ned Kelly at our childrens' school. When it came to Ned killing the police, I asked if he was OK with this. He was. I discussed with the RUC men why it was important to healing some of the oppression of the Australian frontier for children to understand the suffering of Ned's mum – a theme of the play. Perhaps surprisingly, it turned out that RUC torturers understood Ned's perspective too.

III SOCIETIES WITH DECLINING LEVELS OF DOMINATION AND VIOLENCE

The uprisings that spread across Europe in 1848 also affected the countries that defeated Napoleon militarily – Britain, Prussia, Russia, and the Habsburg Empire. After Napoleon's armies dismantled feudalism across much of the rest of Europe, the monarchies that defeated Napoleon grew bourgeois revolutions that saw peasants benefit from land reforms in varied and complex ways to enjoy freedom to choose whether their noble landlord or the factory owner offered them better opportunities once they became organized to clamour for labour rights.

The 18th century revolutions in France and America were important in Hugo's thinking because they started dynamics that would lead to peasants, factory workers, slaves, and women organizing to get property rights, the right to vote and more genuine access to the justice of the police and courts than was available from the likes of Hugo's Javier. Beyond the states that had republican revolutions, liberty, equality, and feminist fraternity grew across the North Atlantic and spread to far-flung European settler societies on other continents.

Modern European societies mostly became low-crime societies in comparative terms and in the historical terms documented in *Macrocriminology and Freedom*.⁷ The Russian Czar did not reform enough after learning lessons from 1848: he got a communist revolution and a firing squad instead. *Macrocriminology and Freedom* argues that Russia's path was an inferior one to liberation from street crime, corporate crime, state crime, and from war. The Russian Revolution followed an inferior path to non-domination. Likewise with

⁷ Braithwaite (n 1) Ch 3.

a China that had been humiliated by colonial militaries in the 19th century. After the promise of Sun Yat-sen's 1911 republican revolution, the West refused to support Sun, because banks and other western corporations in Hong Kong and Shanghai persuaded Western leaders that Sun was a dangerous socialist. In fact, Sun was a social democrat who wanted to build strong private Chinese businesses. He had a deeper commitment to democracy than Western states.⁸ Sun's republican values were sold out to tyrants like Chiang Kai-shek who were more acceptable to Western banks. An unfree China with more criminalized business corporations and a more criminalized state was the outcome.⁹ Redemptively, however, authoritarian Taiwan ultimately reformed toward a more Sun version of liberty, equality, and feminist fraternity. Taiwan's land reforms helped its peasants greatly. They laid foundations for a society in the top quartile of economic equality. Fear of communism motivated this Sun style of ultimate social democratic shift. In fact, all of democratic East Asia achieved a comparable level of equality to Western European welfare states, and in every case built on a foundation of egalitarian land reform for the peasants motivated by fear of communism.¹⁰ The other cases I am thinking about here are Japan, South Korea, and Mongolia alongside Taiwan. Like western Europe, these states all do reasonably well on Gini inequality, corruption as measured by Transparency International, homicide, poverty-reduction, and freedom. Mongolia has a uniquely strong history of feminist empowerment that goes back to the time of Genghis Khan's empire,¹¹ continued under Mongolian communism and in democratic Mongolia. As a post-communist society, Mongolia struggled to remain in the bottom quartile of the Transparency International corruption index, but the other three remained there and this part of the world enjoyed low levels of crime even compared to North-Western Europe. Fear of communism motivated conservative regimes in Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan to implement comparatively redistributive land reforms to benefit peasants.

Across Western Europe and East Asia, conservative political leaders delivered much to redistributive reform. We see this in Germany, for example, from Bismarck's leadership

⁸ Audrey Wells, *The Political Thought of Sun Yat-sen: Development and Impact* (Palgrave, 2001).

⁹ This Chinese aspect of my narrative is developed in Braithwaite (n 1) 14-21, 99-181.

¹⁰ Jong-sung You, 'Land Reform, Inequality, and Corruption: A Comparative Historical Study of Korea, Taiwan, and the Philippines' (2014) 12(1) *The Korean Journal of International Studies* 191-224.

¹¹ Jack M Weatherford, *The Secret History of the Mongol Queens: How the Daughters of Genghis Khan Rescued His Empire* (Crown, 2010).

in building a welfare state to fend off communism. Bismarck's successors in the aftermath of World War I supported a German Labour movement that wanted an International Labour Organization. It achieved a great deal during the twentieth century in globalizing labour standards and modest improvements in the dignity of work. Finally, a leader from the conservative side of politics – Angela Merkel – was stalwart in her defence of the welfare state, a women's rights and refugee rights reformer, and a prudent peacemaker of the long European peace who favoured dialogue that respected the dignity of adversaries at times when other leaders traded on disrespect and provocation.

These European and East Asian democracies have made mostly impressive progress toward sustained growth of freedom and low crime in comparative cross-national terms and in terms of more violent, more despotic pasts of their own histories. Yet, great domination remains and this especially fuels high levels of corporate crime according to *Macrocriminology and Freedom*. There is no such thing as social democracy that achieves excessive equality between the lowest paid workers and owners of capital, feminism that achieves too much domination reduction for women, a social movement against slavery that approaches abolition of modern slavery, and a land rights movement that justly redistributes a Continent's stolen lands. Endless struggle for less domination continues with no fear of achieving too much equality. This is because the forces of domination are ever diligent at retrieving the ground they lose.

The core message of *Macrocriminology and Freedom* can be summarized in one sentence: strengthen freedom to prevent crime; prevent crime to strengthen freedom. Because that is so abstract, it is fleshed out into 150 more specific explanatory and normative propositions and into a proposed program of research to revise and test them. This essay simply adds a 151st proposition to the research program.

The theory claims to explain the big picture patterns of crime. Where freedom as non-domination enjoys a sustained upwards trajectory, crime falls. I read this as the history of democratic Europe and East Asia for the most part since 1945, and in earlier eras such as that of the Hugo lens. There was progress of social movement politics for freedom and dignity through nonviolent struggle against the odds after 1848, but not through the violent revolution that some on the Paris barricades wanted.

IV VIOLENCE AND DOMINATION IN LATIN AMERICA

The republican revolutions of Latin America two centuries ago seemed inspiring at the time but did not have the effects just described for Europe and East Asia. When a tiny Communist regional power arose in Latin America (Cuba), it was not feared in the way the spectres of Russian and Chinese Communism were feared in Europe and East Asia. Landed elites of Latin America remained effectively in total control politically. Landlords captured militaries to their projects. Militaries with CIA training, weapons, and intel executed coups against social democratic regimes at the behest of the landlord class. The US was recurrently proactive in supporting death squads and coups against social democratic leaders like Salvatore Allende in Chile and Jacobo Arbenz in Guatemala, and in educating Latin American militaries in how to do this through the School of the Americas.¹² The CIA supported coups that covered the overwhelming majority of the population of Latin America, mostly during the Cold War.

Nicaragua was an early intervention from 1909 that encouraged a conservative overthrow of the elected government after Nicaragua invited Japan to assist with building a canal to link Pacific and Atlantic trade, The intervention included landing of US Marines in Nicaragua.¹³ Earlier still, in the Indian wars of the 18th and 19th century, the United States boosted pliant Indigenous leaders and assassinated leaders who stood in the way of 'manifest destiny' for North American conquest. Intervention in Mexico was more dramatic than simply interfering in which government would rule; it was an invasion of Mexico that started in 1846 after geopolitical intent to annex Texas, California, Arizona, New Mexico, and parts of other states such as Oregon from Mexico became part of US manifest destiny. Interventions aimed at regime change moved on to other large Latin American countries: Brazil in the 1960s and Argentina in the 1970s, ultimately getting around to most of the smaller countries as well.

¹² Lesley Gill, *The School of the Americas: Military Training and Political Violence in the Americas* (Duke University Press, 2004).

¹³ Britannica (eds), *Nicaragua: Foreign Intervention* (Encyclopaedia Britannica, 2022); US Department of State Archive, 'US Intervention in Nicaragua, 1911-1912', (Web Page, Released 2009) <<https://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/ip/108629.htm>>.

Marc Becker lists 56 different US military interventions in Latin America, mostly small incursions, since 1890.¹⁴ My hypothesis is that collaboration between the landlord class and the CIA, between militarization of the state and criminalization of the state, helps explain why Latin America became a high crime, high inequality region of the world where El Salvador vies with other Latin American countries to hold the title for the highest rate of femicide in the world.

Regime change meddling engendered shadow governments of business cronies entangled with military elites who ensured that elections were fixed so their puppets won. The endless, bloody civil wars and the cleaning out of clean candidates morphed into drug cartel wars and a US war on drugs. United States regime change operations after 1970 and interventions in civil wars facilitated the emergence of criminal gangs through the creation of large pools of people with military training while concurrently causing economic devastation that left few employment opportunities to offer former combatants across Central America.¹⁵ Excellent quantitative criminology consistently shows that the war on drugs sponsored by the US made the violence worse rather than better. That is, where the War on Drugs had most success in decapitating cartel warlords, violence subsequently increased most steeply.¹⁶

A normally less visible part of this problem was when CEOs of companies like ITT persuaded a US President that Salvador Allende was a communist when he was a social democrat; and a CEO of United Fruit who persuaded another US President that Jacobo Arbenz was a communist when his actual sin was increasing taxes on United Fruit, applying minimum wage laws to United Fruit workers, and promoting land reforms that saw some United Fruit land transferred to use by peasant farmers.¹⁷ Similarly, many western companies wanted business relationships with South African traders in

¹⁴ Marc Becker's Homepage 2011, 'History of US Interventions in Latin America', *Yachana Teaching Resources* (Web Page, 20 June 2022)

<<https://www.yachana.org/teaching/resources/interventions.html>>. An updated and easier starting place for beginning to chase down literatures on these cases is the Wikipedia lists and sources for 'United States Involvement in Regime Change', <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_involvement_in_regime_change>. However, an anonymous referee correctly pointed out that 'Wikipedia has multiple issues with how it defines the phenomenon of regime change'.

¹⁵ I am grateful to an anonymous referee for suggesting this addition.

¹⁶ Braithwaite (n 1) 95.

¹⁷ Stephen Schlesinger and Stephen Kinzer, *Bitter Fruit: The Story of the American Coup in Guatemala, Revised and Expanded* (Harvard University Press, 2020); Peter Chapman, *How the United Fruit Company Shaped the World* (Canongate, 2007).

diamonds, gold and other products; they persuaded Western governments that Nelson Mandela was another communist and terrorist who should be in prison.

The global human rights movement, the social movement for social democracy, and the social movements against slavery and racism, neglected this business dimension in their advocacy for far too many decades, leaving business elites in charge as they bought Western politicians with campaign contributions. Dwight D Eisenhower was one conservative President who reflected on his own errors when he warned successors to be wary of a military-industrial complex that in his time as President wanted to fight a war with China over Taiwan in 1958, and earlier advocated complete military defeat of China (and nuclear attack if needed) as the Korean War escalated. Regionally, Eisenhower worried about defence contractors benefiting from endless war in Latin America. The contractors outlasted Eisenhower and the Cold War.

The problem of violence and inequality is connected to the politics of race in the sense of being a legacy of slavery and colonialism. That way of seeing reveals more than the problem conceived as a culturally Latin legacy. *Macrocriminology and Freedom*¹⁸ includes a diagnosis of Jamaica as a country with an extreme homicide rate, extreme criminalization of state and markets as a survivor of British colonialism, slavery, and landlord power that during the Cold War saw the CIA arm one political party and Cuba another. Violence of organized crime groups linked to these political parties continues to devastate the country more than any war could have. Societies that had more nineteenth century slavery have more crime today. Poverty is worse today in those African societies that supplied more slaves in past centuries.¹⁹ *Macrocriminology and Freedom* argues that racist legacies of slavery explain why the highest crime societies are the most unequal societies of the Americas and Africa, more so than unequal societies on other continents. Colonial republicans including William Penn and Benjamin Franklin believed in learning from the deliberative democratic institutions of American First Nations and in finding a Constitutional architecture of peace and union with these nations.²⁰ Their reasoning was

¹⁸ Braithwaite (n 1) 105, 142, 257-9.

¹⁹ Nathan Nunn, 'The Long-Term Effects of Africa's Slave Trades' (2008) 123(1) *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* 139-176.

²⁰ Donald A Grinde and Bruce E Johansen, *Exemplar of Liberty: Native America and the Evolution of Democracy* (UCLA American Indian Studies Center, 1991); David Graeber and David Wengrow, *The Dawn of Everything: A New History of Humanity* (Signal Books, 2021).

crushed by the rifle butts of those who believed in genocidal spread of Christian civilization.

V VIOLENCE OF FOREIGN INTERVENTIONS WORLDWIDE

In all corners of the world, from Indonesia to Iran to many African states, political leaders did not need to be in alliance with Moscow to be targets for regime change. Being a social democratic leader of the non-aligned movement could be enough to trigger US support for coups or other regime change machinations, especially when social democrats required American corporations to pay higher taxes and wages or threatened nationalization. In fact, US regime change interventions were concentrated in non-aligned states during the Cold War and were not more likely to help democratic than non-democratic states stay on top (with 44 of 64 covert interventions supporting authoritarian forces).²¹ Data on US covert operations (which include both regime change and regime maintenance interference), reveal US covert intervention decreased the likelihood that a targeted state would become a democracy by approximately 30 percent over the next 20 years.²² Mesquita and Downs concluded that interveners best secure their goals by installing autocracies or 'a rigged-election democracy' in the target state. Crushed democratic impulses and institutions best deliver the concessions foreign interveners seek because their puppets 'need not cater to the preferences of the median voter to remain in power'.²³

The conclusion that great power regime change interventions shackle longer-run hopes for democracy, especially social democracy, is supported by qualitative and quantitative research. That literature sustains the conclusion that if what the United States was attempting in the late twentieth century was intervention for democracy promotion, it was not good at it.²⁴ Incompetence continued this century with botched US interventions

²¹ Lindsey A O'Rourke, 'The Strategic Logic of Covert Regime Change: US-Backed Regime Change Campaigns During the Cold War' (2020) 29(1) *Security Studies* 92-127, 101.

²² Daniel Berger, Alejandro Corvalan, William Easterly and Shanker Satyanath, 'Do Superpower Interventions Have Short and Long Term Consequences for Democracy?' (2013) 41(1) *Journal of Comparative Economics* 22-34.

²³ Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and George W Downs, 'Intervention and Democracy' (2006) 60(3) *International Organization* 627-649, 632; see also Alexander B Downes, *Catastrophic Success: Why Foreign-Imposed Regime Change Goes Wrong* (Cornell University Press, 2021) Ch 2.

²⁴ James Meernik, 'United States Military Intervention and the Promotion of Democracy' (1996) 33(4) *Journal of Peace Research* 391-402; Margaret G Hermann and Charles W Kegley, 'The US Use of Military Intervention to Promote Democracy: Evaluating the Record' (1998) 24(2) *International Interactions* 91-114; Mark Peceny, 'Forcing Them to Be Free' (1999) 52(3) *Political Research Quarterly* 549-582; Bruce

to influence Afghanistan elections failing to achieve whatever outcomes NATO powers were attempting to achieve there, and certainly failing to sustain democracy.²⁵

Large numbers of new democracies were created in the twentieth century. Great power intervention can take little credit. Latin America has become a region of social democratic, Indigenous, and feminist hope, renewed with the first election of a left President in Colombia in June 2022; pledged to the land reform program of the Colombian Peace agreement of 2016 that was suppressed by the previous government and the death squads. The tide of far-right governments rose and rose across the Americas during the Cold War and beyond. These regimes were supportive of an armed right with a right to bear arms in civil society that delivered extraordinary levels of gun violence across the Americas. Latin America is the region with the highest levels of police killings. In North America, the United States has by far the highest rate of police killings among all developed economies, Canada the second highest.²⁶

Today journalists talk not of a new Red Tide but of a Pink Tide of redistribution, non-violence, and commitment to deepened democracy after President Bolsonaro was defeated in Brazil. The Pink Tide is an Americas where far-right governments have been pushed from power across more than 90 per cent of the Western hemisphere. While this supports a politics of hope that anti-domination social movements cannot be suppressed forever, reversals can be foreseen. Post-Right governments reach for simplistic fixes like the President in the country with the highest homicide rate in the world, El Salvador, seeking to lift his people out of poverty by becoming the only government to officially commit to a cryptocurrency, a Ponzi policy of hope for poverty alleviation. On the positive side, civil war has hit an all-time low in Latin America. It will be instructive to observe whether homicide declines in Latin America in the 2020s and 30s compared to the 2010s. When Levin added Soviet cases of meddling in democratic elections to the US cases, he built supplementary evidence of impetus for democratic breakdown as a consequence of

Bueno de Mesquita and George W Downs, 'Intervention and Democracy' (2006) 60(3) *International Organization* 627-649; Scott Walker and Frederic S Pearson, 'Should We Really "Force Them to Be Free?" An Empirical Examination of Peceny's Liberalizing Intervention Thesis' (2007) 24(1) *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 37-53; Lindsey A O'Rourke, *Covert Regime Change* (Cornell University Press, 2018).

²⁵ Scott Shane, 'Russia Isn't the Only One Meddling in Elections. We Do It, Too' *New York Times* (17 February 2018).

²⁶ Braithwaite (n 1) 67.

Soviet meddling.²⁷ The Soviets were like the United States in supporting authoritarian, anti-democratic regime change that they believed served their interests. That is one reason I hypothesize that Africa and the Middle East come in after Latin America and the Caribbean as high violence regions of the planet – because Great Power support for coups and insurgencies caused such a large number of proxy wars across these regions of the planet. US military and regime change operations were hugely counterproductive across Latin America, likewise in Congo, Iran, Vietnam, right up to the recent militarized meddling in Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya. Likewise, Moscow's biggest investments in Afghanistan,²⁸ and today in Ukraine, involve equally catastrophic loss of blood and treasure, setting back its great power status economically and geopolitically. Western media commentators like to say in the aftermath of Russia and the West both sharing disasters in Afghanistan and Ukraine that regime change and nation building rarely runs according to plan. What particularly does not work in contemporary conditions is invasions, coerced regime change, and militarized nation building. Ask Indonesian elites how much their 270 million citizens with a huge army benefitted from invading a society of one million in East Timor in 1975?

Alexander Downes studied all instances (120) of foreign-imposed regime changes over the past two centuries (to 2008). Foreign-imposed regime change doubled the likelihood

²⁷ Dov H Levin, 'A vote for freedom? The Effects of Partisan Electoral Interventions on Regime Type' (2019) 63(4) *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 839-868.

²⁸ Afghanistan was always geostrategically important as a gateway between Europe and South Asia. At least the US and Russia did not manifest the depth of folly of the foreign power striving to conquer and hold Afghanistan that the British Empire manifested in its heyday: 'Having seemingly learned nothing from their first Afghan debacle [the British invasion and occupation of Afghanistan between 1839 and 1842], Britain invaded again in 1878 for the same reason (supposed Russian encroachment on Kabul), for the same purpose (to install a leader who would protect British interests), and with the same outcome (massive revolt after initial victory).' Downes' book is entitled *Catastrophic Success: Why Foreign-Imposed Regime Change Goes Wrong*: at Alexander B Downes (Cornell University Press, 2021) Ch 2, because militarized initial regime change is not difficult for powers as great as the British Empire, Russia, and the United States. But it is only a matter of time before regime change sours. Even cases like Iran and Democratic Republic of Congo that Downes considered intervention 'successes' because puppets installed by Western regime-change interventions during the Cold War survived for little more than two decades, by 1979 in Iran and 1997 in DRC, these Western puppets would be deposed and followed by decades of war making and geopolitical disaster for the West. The most enduring and persuasive cases of foreign-enforced regime change that Downes considered the most 'shining successes' were Germany and Japan in 1945 (and one might add Italy). These all became sustained, successful, peaceloving, pro-US democracies. Their transformations are distinctive in that they were preceded by the most massive and deadly military defeat in human history that seemingly quashed all militarist ambition of the losers for eight decades. Defeat was followed by the most generous hand of recovery ever extended by victor to vanquished, the Marshall Plan. Thirdly, these states had histories of institutional strength that could be appealed to, renewed. These three conditions are missing from other regime change interventions. Downes might have done better to focus on these three drivers of the 1945 exceptionalism he identified.

of civil war over the next ten years in leadership change cases and tripled it in cases where leadership change was combined with institutional change. It can also produce interstate war. As Mearsheimer puts it, in the age of nationalism, 'occupation almost always breeds insurgency'.²⁹ Leadership change also increases the likelihood of subsequent violent removal of the leader who benefited from the regime change.³⁰ Downes argues that the historical record is clear that foreign interventions to topple disliked regimes are costly for the intervener and more likely to cause counterproductive blowback than the intended successful imposition of a hegemonic will. While one might expect the replacement client installed to state leadership after the foreign intervention to align with the preferences of the intervener, they do not become more aligned with intervener voting records at the United Nations, nor do they acquire similar alliance portfolios.³¹ Foreign-sponsored regime change is likely to cause the military to disintegrate and disperse to the countryside to help train and launch insurgencies. Imposed leaders tend to get into quandaries between supporting their foreign sponsors and domestic demands for political change.

Downes found that the United States has been the most consistently recidivist regime changer of the past two centuries, with the Soviet Union a distant second, followed closely by Britain, Germany and France, with Austria seventh on this list and Italy ninth. Guatemala and El Salvador fill out that list, being both common victims and perpetrators of foreign regime change. Honduras tops the list of countries that have been most recurrently targeted by successful foreign regime changes, followed by Afghanistan, then Nicaragua and Dominican Republic third and fourth, and Guatemala and El Salvador both being among the eight most targeted countries. The data shows that regime change has been overwhelmingly a game played by the NATO states and Russia.³² Of the 153 regime change interveners, not one was China, though we should contest the data-set by pointing

²⁹ John Mearsheimer, *The Great Delusion: Liberal Dreams and International Realities* (Yale University Press, 2018) 142, 169.

³⁰ Alexander B Downes, *Catastrophic Success: Why Foreign-Imposed Regime Change Goes Wrong* (Cornell University Press, 2021).

³¹ Ibid Conclusion.

³² The US and Russia were followed closely by Britain, Germany and France, with Austria seventh on this list of repeat regime changers, and Italy ninth. Guatemala and El Salvador fill out that list, being both common victims and perpetrators of foreign regime change. Honduras tops the list of countries that have been most recurrently targeted by successful foreign regime changes, followed by Afghanistan, then Nicaragua and Dominican Republic third and fourth, and Guatemala and El Salvador both being among the eight most targeted countries.

out that the 1951 agreement of the Dalai Lama to join Tibet to China, followed by flight of the Dalai Lama from Tibet under military pressure in 1959, was effectively, if not technically, a foreign regime change. There are no Asian, African, nor Middle Eastern states (perhaps surprisingly) on the list of the most recurrent foreign regime changers.

Foreign electoral interference may likewise be a 'catastrophic success' within the power of states as powerful as the US and Russia because meddling 'increases support for the assisted side by around 3%'.³³ Levin shows that overt great power attempts to shape elections are as common as one in nine competitive elections in the world between 1946 and 2000. Their success was real but also catastrophic, as illustrated by what analysis of surveys reveals about US intervention in meddling, as well as Levin's models. Such analyses indicated that US meddling turned a 1992 Israel election to install Yitzhak Rabin, only to have him assassinated in 1995 after advancing a Palestinian peace process that never advanced again. In aggregate across more than a hundred cases of US and Russian electoral interference, meddling increased terrorist group emergence between 1968 and 2000 by 11 percent and increased levels of domestic terrorism by an average of 152 percent in the next ten years for the targeted country (between 1970 and 2000).³⁴

Downes discusses belief in an 'elite consensus' about the US literature, particularly since defeat in Afghanistan, that if only COIN (counterinsurgency doctrine), or this or that aspect of intervention policy, had been done better, institutional and leadership regime change cases would have succeeded. If this were true, however, it would be possible to pick out more cases beyond the 1945 regime changes where leadership and institutional change produced the long-run successes of the Marshall Plan. In that US elite consensus literature, blame tends to be placed on the difficulty of 'nation building', when the more evidence-based inference is that foreign intervention to coerce regime change is the problem. 'Nation building' is certainly difficult in the hands of UN peacekeeping operations as well and has many failures. Studies of large numbers of peacekeeping cases, however, convincingly show a high statistical success rate overall. Multidimensional UN peacebuilding operations where war torn states commit to a peace agreement and UN peacekeeping are, in contrast to militarized regime change, highly cost-effective at

³³ See Dov H Levin, *Meddling in the Ballot Box: The Causes and Effects of Partisan Electoral Interventions* (Oxford University Press, 2020).

³⁴ Dov H Levin, 'Voting for Trouble? Partisan Electoral Interventions and Domestic Terrorism' (2020) 32(3) *Terrorism and Political Violence* 489-505.

building peace, economic recovery and prospects of democracy.³⁵ In fact, there are few public investments that are more effective for building a stronger world economy with less suffering.³⁶ Miserliness in support for societies struggling to reconcile and recover from conflict makes no sense. At the same time, there is an evidence-based case for cost savings by desisting from interfering militarily in other countries, desisting from interfering in their elections and in their regime choices in general.

The problem of covert or overt US interference to foster regime change, and its approach of tarring redistributive social democrats with the same brush as communists, was at its worst in Latin America because the 1823 Monroe Doctrine declared the Western Hemisphere to be a sphere of US influence. Two hundred years ago, US support for Latin American decolonization through republican revolutions raised hopes of liberation from imperial domination. These were dashed by the imperium of a new kid on the block.

The problems of violent US intervention were at their least with targets that were NATO democracies and close allies. Interference with allies risked undermining bipartisan solidarity with the US alliance. Covert electoral intervention is very common with US allies, however, with variegated effects. In Japan, the cash provided to the Liberal Democratic Party by the CIA during five election intervention events³⁷ may have been quite instrumental in guaranteeing its unchallenged domination of Japan for decades beyond the Cold War. This had the cost of creating an effective one-party democracy with untouchable leaders. After the scandal of \$12 million Lockheed bribes to Japanese Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka, however, the clang of the jailhouse door echoed for the first time for leaders who mattered in Washington. Tanaka was sentenced to four years prison.

VI SYSTEMATIC EVIDENCE ON INTERFERENCE FREQUENCY AND EFFECTS

Lindsey O'Rourke's data set concludes that the US intervened covertly ten times as frequently as overtly, that it often takes a long time before declassification of cabinet records and other disclosures provide sufficient evidence to confirm formerly

³⁵ Barbara F Walter, Lise Morje Howard and V Page Fortna, 'The Extraordinary Relationship Between Peacekeeping and Peace' (2020) (2021) 51(4) *British Journal of Political Science* 1705-1722.

³⁶ Paul Collier, *Wars, Guns, and Votes: Democracy in Dangerous Places* (Harper, 2009) 96; Braithwaite (n 1) 300.

³⁷ Collier (n 36) 96.

unconfirmed covert cases.³⁸ O'Rourke documented 64 covert regime change campaigns during the Cold War, with overt ones like Cuba counting among a minority of 6 cases. Even the Bay of Pigs invasion, Operation Mongoose, and its multiple attempts to assassinate Fidel Castro were at one time covert matters. Other kinds of foreign interventions that fell short of regime-change were the proxy insurgencies studied by Melissa Lee that (as in 2014 Russian support for Eastern Ukraine separatists) deprived the target of full consolidation of its state by loss of control of one region of it. When Russia and other powers destabilize other states by supporting insurgencies this can weaken state consolidation of authority and development so that when the intervener gets the successor regime, they prefer that regime may also fail when it inherits a Leviathan that remains 'crippled' by the insurgency.³⁹

In the O'Rourke data set, cases were not counted unless US policymakers explicitly state in official records that their objective was regime change. Alleged destabilization of Australia's Whitlam government in 1975 falls way short of this coding threshold, for example. It is likely that there are many other cases where the US interfered merely to help one party it preferred, or to hobble somewhat a party it disliked, without being committed to anything as explicit as regime change intent that is so recorded on the public decision making record. It also ignores CIA dark operations that political leaders did not support or know about and that therefore were never discussed in a way that appeared on the public record. Another aspect of the under-count is that it ignores US regime change operations since 1990. Extending the count by another ten years to 2000, Levin counted only covert or overt partisan interventions in foreign elections; he counted 81 by the United States and 36 by the USSR or Russia.⁴⁰ The United Kingdom has also mounted many regime change interventions, sometimes in collaboration with the US, but often independently. Cormac argues that we learn less about British covert operations because they are better than the CIA at keeping them covert.⁴¹ Regime change operations by US allies such as Saudi Arabia and Rwanda that enjoy tacit US support are also not

³⁸ Lindsey A O'Rourke, 'The Strategic Logic of Covert Regime Change: US-Backed Regime Change Campaigns During the Cold War' (2020) 29(1) *Security Studies* 92-127.

³⁹ Melissa M Lee, *Crippling Leviathan: How Foreign Subversion Weakens the State* (Cornell University Press, 2020).

⁴⁰ Dov H Levin, 'Partisan Electoral Interventions by the Great Powers: Introducing the PEIG Dataset' (2019) 36(1) *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 88-106.

⁴¹ Rory Cormac, *Disrupt and Deny: Spies, Special Forces, and the Secret Pursuit of British Foreign Policy* (Oxford University Press, 2018).

counted. O'Rourke counts 70 target countries, when it is well documented that many target countries like Cuba, Guatemala and Chile had a number of regime change attempts across decades for one target case in the data set.

George W Bush wasted opportunities when old adversaries like Iran, Russia and China offered considerable support in Afghanistan and beyond against Al Qaeda. Bush castigated allies who were not 'all the way with USA', drawing the line 'You are either with us or against us'. What America needed in 2001 were allies who were so fond of America to be critical friends of policies of invasion of countries that had not attacked the United States (Afghanistan and Iraq); and critical friends of policies that encouraged others to be proxy invaders of Libya in 2011, including some dubious despots such as the Sudanese regime that rolled its tanks against Muammar Gaddafi;⁴² and critical of a dubiously motivated French President who wanted Gaddafi dead and who is now being prosecuted for accepting illegal campaign contributions from Gaddafi. Bush and Barack Obama would have been well served by friends robustly advancing alternatives to protracted war in Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya, including early peace negotiations that resolved grievances with their unattractive leaders, starting with peace deals offered by the Taliban leadership in 2001, 2002, up to 2005, and again around 2009.⁴³ Had NATO done that, Islamic State affiliates might not have spread to become a more deadly terrorism problem, even after their defeats in Iraq and Syria led on the ground by the Kurds. Islamic State affiliates are still twice as dangerous today in global terrorist killings, than Al Qaeda was from 2001.⁴⁴ Had the United States been less bull-at-a-gate in the way it approached Libya on the Security Council in 2011, had it listened to the point of view of Russia, China and African Union leaders who believed they had persuaded Gaddafi to go without a war that destroyed his state and society (and cascaded civil wars across Africa, fought with Gaddafi's armoury), the Security Council might still be in the post-1990 era where it got things done for peace. There might still be the trust of great power vetoes being extremely rare for more than a decade.

⁴² Alex de Waal, 'African Roles in the Libyan Conflict of 2011' (2013) 89(2) *International Affairs* 365-379.

⁴³ As discussed by John Braithwaite and Bina D'Costa, *Cascades of Violence: War, Crime and Peacebuilding Across South Asia* (ANU Press, 2018) 402-403 and David Kilcullen and Greg Mills, *The Ledger: Accounting for Failure in Afghanistan* (Hurst Publishers, 2021).

⁴⁴ Kilcullen and Mills (n 43).

Those of us who believe in dialogue with Russia, the United States and China, serve all of them well by saying to Russia in the aftermath of Vladimir Putin's criminal invasion of Ukraine, 'don't make the terrible situation you have got your country into worse by pushing back on the expanding Western Alliance against you by attempting an equally strong military alliance against NATO with China.'⁴⁵ At the same time, peace-loving countries could today be saying to China, don't allow yourselves to be drawn into future wars of comparable foolishness to the Russian invasion of Ukraine by joining a mutual defence pact with Russia.' 'Your interests are quite different from theirs and we say this to you as friends of China as well as friends of peace.' As ASEAN countries effectively do say to China as genuine friends of China, others should likewise say to China 'don't seize the opportunity of weakened US support for currently economically collapsing countries that surround India – Afghanistan, Sri Lanka, Pakistan, Nepal, Myanmar - by coming to their rescue economically on condition that they join a defence pact with China to balance NATO and the Quad.' Let us all speak up about the dangers of widening military alliance structures that might turn future little wars into wars that end us all. Post-Ukraine, who can blame many Eastern European countries for wanting to come under guarantees that NATO will send troops to fight if Russia attacks them? Equally, who can doubt that a 2020s alliance structure like that which evolved before World War I, and that locks many states in to escalate into a world war, puts the whole planet at risk.

In these terms, Australia's nearest geopolitically significant friends, Indonesia, and New Zealand, have become more constructive players for regional peace and prosperity than

⁴⁵ Pursuant to my non-interference theme, we might also say 'Lets both desist from interfering in each other's elections because the meddling of both of us has backfired on that front.' Would Biden have declared such a vigorous US proxy war against Russia in Ukraine had Putin not interfered successfully for Hilary Clinton's election defeat at the hands of Donald Trump? On its side, the US must bear in mind that it interfered to discredit other candidates and prop up fading support for Boris Yeltsin in his implausible 1996 re-election when inflation, poverty and crime were skyrocketing, sustainable development in freefall. As Yeltsin's health and popularity faded further, it was Yeltsin who plucked Vladimir Putin from obscurity as his successor. It was hard to foresee that this succession to Putin would be such a terrible outcome for US interests. But that is the point. Meddling sows uncertain seeds. Perhaps it was hard also to foresee that the election would be interpreted by the Russian people as one in which Yeltsin perpetrated widespread electoral fraud and benefited from a lot of US support in the form of campaign advisors and more. This was the beginning of the end of the post-Soviet love affair between the Russian and American people. Gorbachev probably reflected the general view in Russia when he said in his book, *The New Russia*, that 'There have been no fair and free elections in Russia since . . . the election of 1991 when Boris Yeltsin became the first president of Russia': Tom Gallagher, 'One Fait Accompli After Another: Mikhail Gorbachev' (8 July 2017) *Los Angeles Review of Books*; Michael Kramer, 'Rescuing Boris: The Secret Story of How Four U.S. Advisers Used Polls, Focus Groups, Negative Ads and All the Other Techniques of American Campaigning to Help Boris Yeltsin Win' (15 July 1996) *Time*. An anonymous reviewer and I think that 1996 was a sufficiently tragic turning point away from democracy to merit this footnote, indeed it was perhaps the most consequential setback to democratic values of recent decades.

Australia. True diplomatic friends of Asia might say that ASEAN or South Korea is on a better path than the Quad. We do not want Asia in the 2020s and 30s to pursue a bifurcation of military alliance structures in the way Europe did before World War I, and in the way NATO has risked during the era of conflict over Ukraine. It is quite possible for the Asian century to continue to be comparatively peaceful for Asia in a way the European and American centuries were not for Europe and the Americas.⁴⁶ This paper specifically contends as part of that more general argument about preventive diplomacy, that social democratic governments in recent decades have been unfaithful friends toward movements for democracy and freedom by failing to speak up against great power interference for regime change, whether by the United States, the UK, China, Russia, Turkey, Israel, or Rwanda. Social democracies have been weak in raising their voices against great power interference in elections and national congresses that nominate leaders, especially by failing to put sensible guardrails around the new cyberespionage. These covert regime change machinations endanger us all and endanger great power cooperation to save the planet from global warming, or from a nuclear winter that ends the life of most humans in a global famine. It is unconscionable for civil societies who love freedom and democracy to continue to be so mute on these dangers that intelligence agencies and the military-industrial complex promote so assiduously.

VII STEPS BACK AND FORWARD FROM DOMINATION

I hypothesize that freedom and social democratic institutions evolve organically *unless* they are suppressed by criminal violence of the kind we saw from the landlord class, the war on drugs, and elites buying politicians in Latin America. When freedom as non-domination has flourished in stateless societies, it only persists so long as militarized states refrain from colonizing them. Violence and elite corruption can set back social movements severely for a long time, as we saw with crushing of the world's most effective trade union movement inside the United States in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century by levels of anti-union violence not seen in any other democracy of that era.⁴⁷

⁴⁶ In that sense, Kevin Rudd is constructive on questions like Chinese and US guardrails against escalations triggered by cyberespionage, and other new technologies of risk: Kevin Rudd, *The Avoidable War: The Dangers of a Catastrophic Conflict between the US and Jio Jinping's China* (Public Affairs, 2022).

⁴⁷ Paul F Lipold and Larry W Isaac, 'Repressing Worker Dissent: Lethal Violence Against Strikers in the Early American Labor Movement' (2022) 63(1) *Labor History* 1-23.

One of the worst setbacks to freedom in the last century was a coup sponsored by the CIA and Britain against a social democratic Iranian regime in 1953. Details were declassified in 2013.⁴⁸ The coup returned the monarchist regime of the Shah to power. This was sufficiently oppressive to induce a revolution to overthrow the Shah led by liberals, social democrats, and a marginalized Kurdish minority, a revolution quickly captured by clerical oligarchs with a violent, exclusionary ideology. The Ayatollahs imprisoned the liberals and the social democrats because they enjoyed superior organizational bases in the society that had not been crushed by the Shah in the way that democratic organizational bases in the trade unions and tribal structures had been crushed.

The trajectory toward social democracy that Mikhail Gorbachev initiated with Glasnost and Perestroika, and its reversal by Putin and his cronies, was another devastating reversal for freedom. No direct covert operation was responsible for Russia's predicament even if Putin alleges this. That is not to deny that preventive US diplomacy could have been more sensitive. The failure of Western powers to support Sun a hundred years ago because of his drive to decolonize China, and opposition to his redistributive policies by Hong Kong and Shanghai bankers, was an earlier mistake of enduring consequence.⁴⁹ Ultimately Western support for authoritarian mass murderers like Chiang Kai-shek not only helped them to crush freedom, but also sustained Mao Zedong with his alternative model of 'liberation', which, as in the USSR, proved a prescription for even deeper domination, and larger numbers of state murders. Other competitors for the worst catastrophes of US regime change and duplicity in crushing freedom and

⁴⁸ Ervand Abrahamian, *The Coup: 1953, the CIA, and the Roots of Modern US-Iranian Relations* (New Press, 2013).

⁴⁹ Discussed in Braithwaite (n 1) Ch 1.

democracy are Congo,⁵⁰ Indonesia⁵¹ and South Africa.⁵² Particularly in their impact across Africa, these rate among the more destructive Western covert operations.

For all of the evidence of such desperately devastating impacts, I optimistically hypothesize that empowering families and education institutions also have a covert presence that grows civil society movements like the movement against Apartheid, the slave trade, the Chartists, the Suffragists. Violence, covert operations by deep states, and buying politicians cannot suppress these movements forever. Europe and democratic East Asia, which had been such violent parts of the world before 1950, did much better on crime and war than the rest of the world after 1950. This was because state crime against advocates for freedom was gradually humbled in Europe and then in democratic East Asia earlier and better than in high income countries like Argentina, Chile, and indeed the United States, and hugely better than in low-income countries like Congo and Afghanistan.

Macrocriminology and Freedom argues that democracy without checks and balances has dim prospects of survival. Once path dependency on checks and balances that temper power is entrenched, democracy becomes robust and valued by citizens who struggle to preserve it. Until that is achieved, however, elected governments have incentives to

⁵⁰ Search 'Congo' on open access of John Braithwaite and Bina D'Costa, *Cascades of Violence: War, Crime and Peacebuilding Across South Asia* (ANU Press, 2018). US (and Belgian) interference in Congo escalated with involvement in the assassination of President Lumumba in 1961. This admittedly converted Zaire to become one of the strongest US allies during the Cold War. Ruthless US covert support for an extravagantly corrupt and anti-freedom regime in turn contributed to the collapse of the Democratic Republic of Congo. It was once the second most industrialized country in Africa (after South Africa). By the twenty-first century, the DRC sunk to dead last in the world on GDP per capita and on the Human Development Index. It also became the most violent society on the planet, suffering more deaths and rape as a result of war than any country since World War II, with more than 100 armed groups still pillaging the DRC today.

⁵¹ Human Rights Watch, *Indonesia: US Documents Released on 1965-66 Massacres* (18 October 2017). The Indonesian military takeover of 1965 installed President Suharto. It became a less enduring tyranny than in Iran. A people power movement on the streets of Jakarta in 1998 led the most important transition to democracy of the past three decades; transition from a high violence to a low violence and low imprisonment Indonesia that managed the War on Terror with less violence than all the other 'Muslim' societies with lower Muslim populations than Indonesia (which has the largest): John Braithwaite, Valerie Braithwaite, Michael Cookson and Leah Dunn, *Anomie and Violence: Non-truth and Reconciliation in Indonesian Peacebuilding* (ANU Press, 2010). Only in recent years has release of CIA records revealed how central the CIA was in the Suharto coup, with CIA operatives even involved in preparation of hit lists entailed in the murder of 500,000 Indonesians, and perhaps as many as a million, active in trade unions or with allegedly communist sympathies.

⁵² Throughout the Cold War, NATO states supported the Apartheid regime in South Africa and the incarceration of Nelson Mandela and other opposition leaders until a vibrant social movement against Apartheid prevailed.

misgovern. Good government is not the most enriching way of benefiting from power. If you can get away with it, it is better to buy elections, corrupt an electoral commission, intimidate or kill opponents, scapegoat a minority to cultivate majoritarian support, jail strong opponents for corruption and run against weaker ones, or simply miscount votes. Once in government, you can reimburse these costs by pillaging the state. When leaders endeavour to win elections with good government, their capacity to benefit from power is much reduced. This is because good government means checks on abuse of power that place limits on political opportunities to pillage.⁵³

While there are reasons for optimism that natural human preferences against domination survive and prevail in the long run of histories of nations, incentives running the other way are also profound. *Macrocriminology and Freedom* argues that while markets can contribute valuable checks against domination by monopolies – public and private – they also tend to markets gamed by corporate power, re-monopolization, exploitation of workers and consumers, gamed tax systems, and greenwash for environmental crises. Hence, I argue that social democrats can and must commit to regulation that subdues the lure of business tyranny in specific ways. Second, activists must do better at calling out international business lobbying for regime change to remove social democratic parties in emerging democracies. Social democrats in government can choose to support fellow social democrats in oppressed societies. They can support them in preference to allegiance to their national corporate champions and campaign donors when they complain of developing countries that tax them heavily, impose costly environmental laws, or increase minimum wages. Most Australians think it a national disgrace that Australia bugged a Timor-Leste cabinet meeting for commercial intelligence to advantage an Australian carbon giant, which later hired the retiring Foreign Minister as a consultant. Then the deep state prevailed on prosecuting those who blew the whistle on Australian state crime (until the Albanese government came to power). That does not mean the Albanese government will prove to impoverished, war-ravaged Timor-Leste that we are a more trustworthy friend than China. It remains to be seen whether the Albanese government will be effective at preventing the US prosecution of Julian Assange for antagonizing the US deep state with whistleblowing on its war crimes.

⁵³ Collier (n 36).

VIII RESISTING DEEP STATE ADVOCACY OF INTERVENTION

In the long run of history, I hypothesise that we inherit a more secure, freer, less violent world when societies resist business and intelligence service lobbying to follow short-term preferences to interfere in emerging democracies. Later on, there will be fewer Putins, Ayatollahs, Saudi warmongers, Maoist Red Guards, and Islamic States to contend with if robust rejection of such machinations is the road taken. *Macrocriminology and Freedom* argues that there are many (150!) consequential choices for freedom, nonviolence and dignity. A 151st hypothesis discussed herein is neglected in that book:

Choosing defence of social democracy over defence of the military-industrial complex, choosing to oppose any form of foreign interference to fix elections, support military coups, or achieve regime change, contributes to a world with less domination, less violence.

Activists might ponder why this proposition has been so historically neglected in the domestic politics of wealthy countries with social democratic governments.

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